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Why There Should Be No Restatement
of Environmental Law
Dan Tarlock†
INTRODUCTION
There is no Restatement (First, Second, Third, or
Fourth) of Environmental Law. Until 2012, the American Law
Institute (ALI) had never considered preparing one or even
considered an alternative such as a model act or white paper.1
Should the ALI consider the preparation of a Restatement of
Environmental Law? The easy answer is why not? Environmental
degradation continues throughout the world and in the United
States. The law-driven project of rolling back pollution (including
greenhouse gases), reducing the risks of exposure to toxic
substances that threaten the health of humans and ecosystems,
and conserving biodiversity remains an important work in
progress. Environmental law is a relatively new but already
well-established and important practice area and academic
specialty. Since the first modern environmental law case was
decided in 1965,2 there have been several thousand environmental

† A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stanford University. Distinguished Professor of Law,
Chicago-Kent College of Law and elected member American Law Institute. This paper
was originally presented at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium, Restatement of . . . ,
organized by Professor Anita Bernstein. The paper benefitted greatly from the
opportunity to hear a wide range of perspectives on the ALI and the Restatement process.
1 In 2012, a group of environmental scholars asked the ALI to consider two
non-statement projects, a “Project or Report to summarize key principles of underlying
environmental impact analysis,” and a similar undertaking on environmental
enforcement. Memorandum from Dean Irma Russell et al. to the Honorable Lee
Rosenthal and Professor Lance Liebman, Proposal for Project on Environmental Law
(Oct. 3, 2012) (on file with author). The proposal illustrates the extent to which the ALI
is using other means short of a full Restatement to reflect important new legal
developments. Nothing in this article addresses the merits of ALI projects short of a
full Restatement of environmental law.
2 Modern environmental law began with the Second Circuit’s opinion in
Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). For the first time, a court reversed an administrative
decision, a Federal Power Commission license, because the agency had not fulfilled its
“affirmative burden” to consider the environmental impacts of the project and
alternative sources of energy. Id. at 620.

663

664

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

law judicial opinions.3 The subject is also supported by a strong
academic community—even at Harvard4—that has strong ideas
about its direction.5
This article examines several possible explanations for
the ALI’s historic lack of interest in a Restatement of
Environmental Law and whether the Institute should consider
the preparation of a Restatement of Environmental Law. It
concludes that there are no insurmountable barriers to the
preparation of a Restatement, but that the ALI should not do
so because environmental law needs to be reimagined, not
restated. The argument proceeds in two parts. Part I examines
a set of objections based on the subject’s newness, non-common
law basis, positive nature, and the politically charged and
contested, sorry state of contemporary environmental law.6 In
brief, environmental law is neither a common law subject nor
does it have a set of core substitute principles. However, the
lack of traditional subject matter poses no insurmountable
barriers to the preparation of a Restatement. Nonetheless, Part
II argues that the ALI should not attempt a Restatement of
Environmental Law because the subject is too far from the
Institute’s core mission of restating, cleaning up, and modestly
reforming the common or quasi-common law.7

3 The Environmental Law Institute began publishing the Environmental
Law Reporter in 1970 after the seminal 1969 Arlie House conference, which helped
define the emerging field and identified the need for a special compilation of the rapid
cascade of cases triggered by the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969. Phillip H. Hoff & Rep. Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Conclusion, in LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 368 (Malcolm F. Baldwin & James K. Page, Jr. eds., 1970). BNA also
began publishing the Environmental Reporter Cases the same year.
4 In 2005, Harvard appointed Professor Jody Freeman, currently the
Archibald Cox Professor of Law, which was the school’s first appointment of a major
environmental law scholar. The appointment of the distinguished scholar Richard
Lazarus as the Howard and Katherine Aibel Professor of Law followed in 2010.
5 Clark Boardman, now West Publishing, began publishing the Land Use &
Environment Law Review in 1970. The Review is now in its 44th year. A two-level
peer-review process selects the 10 or 11 best articles in the fields of land use and
environmental law for publication in the Review. A. Dan Tarlock & David L. Callies,
Preface, in LAND USE & ENVIRON. L. REV. at v (2012–2013).
6 The foundation of environmental law rests on four major statutes: The
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2011); The Clean
Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2011); the Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et seq. (2011); and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
(2011). All were enacted between 1969 and 1973.
7 This statement skips over the debate, which began with ALI’s founding,
over the function of a Restatement. Should Restatements be only quasi-codifications of
existing law, or should they try to reform the law by bringing it in line with current
social conditions? See Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements
and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 213-20 (2007) (summarizing the debate). I
skip over this debate because it is irrelevant to my argument that the ALI’s focus on
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There is considerable debate whether environmental
law lends itself to substantive principles.8 All students of the
subject matter agree that, at present, the subject is a paradox.
In one respect, environmental law is inherently dynamic
because it must constantly adapt to new insights from the
physical and social sciences. In another respect, for political
reasons it remains frozen in time or is being rolled-back. Because
the ALI process is primarily backward-looking, there is a risk that
a Restatement would freeze the law in its current dysfunctional
and anti-environmental protection mode. Consequently, a
Restatement now would impede the greater goal of effectively
incorporating new interdisciplinary insights to address the
continuing challenges of environmental degradation and global
climate change.9
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: NEW AND POSITIVE

A.

The Romans Didn’t Recognize the Subject

Law schools and the ALI are still controlled by the legal
silos of Roman law. Despite efforts to “enrich” the first-year law
school curriculum or make it more street smart, the core
curriculum still follows the Roman law categories of private and
public law. With perhaps a single exception, the ALI during its first
Restatement Era (1923–1944) logically concentrated on restating
the private law subjects of the first-year curriculum and the related
upper-division courses that followed. The core public law subject,
criminal law, was ultimately addressed through the Model Penal
Code rather than through a Restatement.10 The subjects of the first
Restatements were agency, conflict of laws, contracts, judgments,
property, restitution, security, torts, and trusts. During my law
school years (1962–1965), agency, contracts, property, unjust
enrichment and restitution, and torts were required first year
courses. Judgments was taught as an element of civil procedure
and trusts was a required second-year course.
The trend of concentrating on the first-year common law
curriculum continued in the second Restatement Era (1944–
1987), a period when the ALI mainly updated the Restatements
the common law, in an inherently backward-looking exercise, makes it incapable of
contributing to a dynamic area.
8 See infra notes 54-60.
9 Judge Richard Posner has criticized the ALI for not being sufficiently
interdisciplinary and forward-looking. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 304-07 (1999).
10 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (1985).
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that it had prepared in the first round.11 However, during this
time, the ALI also began to break free from the common–Roman
law heritage and prepared the Restatement of Foreign Relations.
Today, the ALI is increasingly less wedded to the common–
Roman law heritage, but it continues its focus on judge-made,
rather than positive, law. In the third Restatement Era (1987 to
the present), the ALI has continued to restate Roman-law
derived subjects such as suretyship and guaranty. But, the
great project of restating the core of the common law is over.
The ALI has progressively narrowed its focus to specific aspects
of a previously restated law and only incrementally addresses
emerging areas of law.12 Using torts as an example, the ALI
has tried to shape specific, dynamic areas that have more
limited common or Roman law roots, such as products liability,
apportionment of liability, physical and emotional harm, and
unfair competition. Thus, the fact that a subject was not a
historic Roman law derived first-year subject area is not a per
se barrier to the development of a Restatement today.
B.

The Real Problem is that Environmental Law is Positive
Law

Environmental law suffers from a more serious defect
than its shallow common law roots; it is positive, science-based
law. The restatement or reform of judge-made law has been the
historic focus of the ALI because the Institute was founded on the
premise that law as articulated by an independent judiciary was a
check on tyranny. G. Edward White accurately summed-up the
dominant rule-of-law view of the ALI’s founders when he stated
that law was an “inviolable external” force, “an authoritative
source of wisdom,” and “independent of the authority of those who
laid down the rules that governed disputes.”13 Nazi Germany’s
perversion of the positivist “Rechtsstaat” tradition14 reinforced
the idea that “real law” must be a set of relatively general,
11 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry Smith, Why Restate the Bundle? The
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2014).
12 Many of the suggested topics presented at the Symposium such as child
abuse, voting rights, and children’s rights illustrate the expansion of the ALI’s gaze
and its willingness to incrementally address new areas of law.
13 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 172 (2002).
This sentiment reflected Oliver Wendell Holmes definition of law as a prediction of
what a judge would do. See The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1897).
14 E.g., Kenny Yang, The Rise of Legal Positivism in Germany: A Prelude to Nazi
Arbitrariness?, 3 W. AUSTRALIAN JURIST 245 (2012), available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/
School-of-Law/_document/WA-jurist-documents/WAJ_Vol3_2012_Yang---The-Rise-of-LegalPositivism.pdf.
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stable principles.15 Environmental law does not meet this
condition. Although environmental law has modest roots in the
common law of nuisance,16 it is not the product of an organic
evolution of nuisance law.17 The maze of federal and state
statutes enacted since 1970, and the wildly varying judicial
interpretations of them, constitute the corpus of environmental
law. In fact, environmental law’s most distinctive feature is the
use of positive law to overcome the common law’s inability to
respond to the imperatives of environmental protection as
defined by scientists.18
Environmental law is profoundly antithetical to both
the function of the common law and to the Restatement
tradition. One of the major functions of the common law is to
administer corrective justice by compensating the victims of
injuries to their health or property. By necessity, it looks
backward, not forward. In contrast, at least two out of three of
environmental law’s broad, interrelated objectives are primarily
forward-looking. The initial and continuing objective of
environmental law is to roll back the use of air, soil, and water as
waste sinks. This objective might seem to align reasonably well
with the common law’s focus on corrective justice, but it does
not in fact fit within a corrective justice framework. In the
process of curbing pollution, environmental law must limit,
rather than confirm, historic de facto and de jure entitlements
to pollute the air, soil, and water. And it must do so by forcing
technological innovation.19 As we have learned about the scope of
environmental degradation, the law’s functions have broadened.
Conservation, the protection of the integrity and survival of
functioning ecosystems and the flora and fauna within them, is an
equally important objective.20 The imperative to preserve
15 These criteria are two of Lon Fuller’s eight principles of the rule of law,
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (Rev. ed. 1969).
16 See generally NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR
POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE (2003).
17 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS made some effort to adapt the
doctrine of public nuisance to citizen environmental suits. See Denise E. Antolini,
Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of Special Injury, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q.
755, 767, 835 (2001).
18 See Debora Brosnan, Science, Law, and the Environment: The Making of a
Modern Discipline, 37 ENVTL. L. 987 (2006).
19 See e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(where no credit was given to dischargers for the quality of receiving water because the
Clean Water Act makes “the right of the public to a clean environment . . . preeminent” unless treatment is impractical or unachievable).
20 E.g., Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of
Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 265 (1991) (discussing the rationales for
biodiversity protection).
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biodiversity, however, has no common law roots.21 Living and nonliving non-human entities have no legal personality. The
common law offered (and continues to offer) virtually no
protection for biodiversity. Instead, by creating property rights
to exploit “nature,” the common law encourages its destruction.
As a result, there is no distinctive quasi-common law of
biodiversity protection for the ALI to restate.
Environmental law’s third function is completely
forward-looking. The law seeks to protect humans and nonhumans from a variety of future risks. The risks come from
exposure to toxic substances, the loss of biodiversity, and
climate change. A great deal of environmental regulation, from
toxic pollutant standards to demands for environmental impact
assessments, is an exercise in long-term risk assessment and
management. The common law of torts, the closest analogy to
pollution regulation, offers little precedential guidance. The law of
torts focuses on redressing past injuries and offers limited
protection from future risks. It is extremely difficult to convince a
court to enjoin an activity that poses only a risk of future harm.
As Professor Todd S. Aagaard has observed, “Courts have found
that operationalizing reasonable foreseeability is extremely
difficult.”22 Future risks have been cursed as “speculative”
because they expose parties to liability for injuries that the
parties may not in fact cause. For example, were the
international community to make a serious effort to mitigate
the projected adverse impacts of climate change, it would be
doing so to protect future generations from a wide range of
risks such as droughts, flood, biodiversity loss, and new disease
vectors.23 More generally, and as Hurricane Sandy illustrated,
we are now experiencing the impact of global climate change,
yet there is almost no judge-made law articulating a duty to
mitigate the projected adverse impacts of climate change.24
The ALI can, of course, look forward. To take one of
many examples, the Institute has begun to put its foot into the
swirling waters of risk protection in the Restatement (Third) of
21 See JOHN PASSMORE, MAN’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL
PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS 5 (1974) (tracing to biblical origins the idea of
“nature as a ‘captive to be raped’ rather than a ‘partner to be cherished’”).
22 Todd S. Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties Under
NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 106 (2012).
23 The literature on the risks of climate change is enormous. See, e.g.,
BIODIVERSITY, ECOSYSTEM FUNCTIONING, & HUMAN WELLBEING: AN ECOLOGICAL AND
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Shahid Naeem et al. eds., 2010).
24 See David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in
the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual, 64 FL. L. REV. 15, 77 (2012).
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Torts. Risk is central to the related field of toxic torts, and The
Restatement (Third) of Torts has not shied from dealing with
the tension between traditional and probabilistic concepts of
cause. However, the results of the ALI’s endeavor illustrate the
difficulty of fitting the “wicked” scientific uncertainty, which
pervades environmental law, into a Restatement format. The
Constitution gives the legislature considerable discretion to
base health-protection regulations on the risk of future harm,25
but judges have much less discretion to do so. Due process
requires that responsibility for exposure injuries in toxic-tort suits
must be assigned to a specific emitter and that the plaintiff
establish that the exposure to a toxic substance caused a specific
injury.26 For this reason, and especially after Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,27 courts have been reluctant to
substitute probabilistic risk estimates for the traditional causein-fact analysis.28
The Restatement (Third) of Torts reaffirms the “but for”
test for causation in all tort cases, including toxic torts. It also
recognizes, though, the special problems of proving that
exposure to toxic substances can result in serious future health
problems and that the injury can include the risk of serious
future harm. Instead of a set of rules, however, the Restatement
(Third) uses a Reporter’s Note to provide guidance to courts
grappling with the assignment of responsibility.29 Comment c
breaks new ground; it was prepared after extensive consultation
with doctors and scientists. The Comment recognizes that
exposure to toxic substances is a serious problem and that
traditional definitions of causation make it extremely difficult
for those who have been exposed to obtain any recovery.
The Comment does not endorse the notion that
probabilistic cause can always be substituted for “but for”
causation. It does recognize, however, that the law of torts
cannot always demand complete short-term, casual certainty in
25 E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding
Section 109(b) of the Clean Air Act’s mandate to the EPA to set ambient air quality
standards to protect public health “allowing an adequate margin of safety” is a valid
delegation of legislative power (citations omitted)).
26 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to
Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 147475, 1514-24 (1986).
27 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (finding that courts must exercise a gatekeeper
function over the validity of proffered scientific evidence).
28 Steve C. Gold, The “Reshapement” of the False Negative Asymmetry in
Toxic Tort Causation, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1507, 1520-33 (2011).
29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARMS § 28, reporter’s note, cmt. c(3) (2010).

670

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

toxic substance exposure cases.30 The Comment recognizes that
causation is a matter of degree and collapses the distinction
between general (exposure) and specific (injury) causation in
cases where the level of casual certainty falls below the “but
for” standard. Comment c thus opens the door to proof of
causation through the use of probabilistic estimates of risk.31 This
development is a progressive step for toxic tort plaintiffs, but it
also illustrates the difficulties of dealing with the scientific
uncertainty inherent in environmental law through a rulebased format.
The ALI’s effort to stake out a position in a dynamic,
science-based area could be a useful precedent for a Restatement
(First) of Environmental Law. However, the positive nature of
environmental law raises an even more fundamental problem.
Environmental law is inherently dynamic because it is a product
of both rational efforts to respond to new problems and raw,
interest-based politics.32 First, dynamic, positive law is best
synthesized in a treatise with frequent updates rather than in
a set of black-letter rules supported by commentary designed to
last for decades. Better yet, environmental law might be best
served by an interactive web site, an enterprise not suited to
the ALI’s deliberate, consensus process. Second, and as
developed in Part II, any attempt to cabin a dynamic area
creates the risk of freezing the law. This is especially
problematic as environmental law has become bitterly
politicized.33 Participants at the symposium identified this as a
problem with many ALI efforts. ALI projects have always had to
negotiate among deeply entrenched interests that saw the
adoption of a particular version of a rule as costly to their
clients. However, as debates over climate change and the steady
undermining of the environmental laws put in place between
1969 and 1980 illustrate, the political consensus that supported
30 Ranes v. Adams Labs, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677, 688 (Iowa 2010) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARMS § 28, cmt. c).
31 Gold, supra note 28, at 1563-73.
32 One could cite numerous examples. One of my favorites is The Stop the
War on Coal Act, H.R. 3409, 112th Cong. (2012), which was approved by a 233–175,
primarily Republican, vote in the House of Representatives just before the November
2012 election. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 603, OFF. CLERK U.S. HOUSE OF
REP., http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll603.xml (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). The Act
would effectively deregulate the coal industry by curbing EPA’s power to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions and to review and reject state water quality standards. See
H.R. 3409, 112th Cong. §§ 201, 501 (2012).
33 For a history of the increasing opposition to environmental regulation, see
generally JUDITH A. LAYZER, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: CONSERVATIVES’ OPPOSITION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2012).

2014]

RESTATEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

671

the basic structure of environmental law has collapsed. ALI
projects can wade into political thickets when the debates over
the subject matter are at the margin, but not when they are at
the core of an area.
C.

There Is No Common Law Substitute

The lack of a developed common law is not a per se bar
to restatement. The real significance of the common law is that
it provides a substantive foundation, one developed over time,
around which a consensus on basic principles has formed.
There are other sources of law that can serve this foundational
function. The Restatement of Foreign Relations, now in its
fourth iteration, found its substantive foundation in positive
international law. The development of a Supreme Court quasiconstitutional jurisprudence can also serve as a set of foundation
principles. The upcoming Restatement of Indian Law is a good
example of a non-common law, constitutional-based
restatement.34 It will be based on the Supreme Court’s long, if
inconsistent, tradition, which began with Chief Justice
Marshall’s work to protect the special status of tribes. His
characterization of tribes as “domestic dependent nations”35 has
led to distinct law of tribal sovereignty within the confines of
plenary federal authority.36 Thus, the Reporter’s hope is that
the Restatement can “cement a set of generally agreed-upon
foundational principles that could shape further developments
in the field.”37
No such quasi-constitutional tradition exists in
environmental law. Environmentalists have long urged the
incorporation of environmental rights into the Constitution,38
but such a scheme of rights faces two seemingly insurmountable
problems. First, the Constitution is primarily a charter of
negative liberties, and thus it imposes no affirmative duties on

34

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS (Discussion

Draft 2013).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS § 3 (“The United
States has a unique trust relationship with Indian tribes and individual Indians,
authorizing the federal government to inter alia safeguard property rights of Indians
and tribes, [and] preserve tribal autonomy . . . .” (emphasis added)).
37 ALI Begins Work on Three New Restatements, A.L.I. E-REPORTER (Oct.
2012), http://www.ali.org/_news/reporter/12oct/12oct.html#ailaw.
38 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, “Greening” the Constitution—Harmonizing
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 828-29 (2002).
35
36
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the state except to treat citizens fairly and with some dignity.39
Second, even if this hurdle can be overcome, the content of any
potential environmental right is too contingent compared to
other rights to be characterized as fundamental. Once one
concedes that citizens have no right to a zero-risk environment,
it is not possible to specify with any level of confidence the
content of a potential environmental right.40 Despite several
decades of scholarly advocacy,41 the idea of a constitutional
right to some environmental state is dead in the water.
Although they are found in many constitutions
throughout the world,42 standards such as a right to a healthy,
clean, and minimal risk environment are hopelessly vague. To
take one example, DNA research has shown that susceptibility
to cancer arises from an unknown mix of environmental and
genetic factors, which adds more complications to any effort to
recognize a public health-based right.43 The problems are
magnified when one turns from health to the conservation of
the physical environment. Flora and fauna have no legal
personality. The common law did not recognize a right to a
minimum level of “nature,” or ecosystem, conservation, and the
1789 Constitution provides no textual support for such rights.
39 Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding that there is no
constitutional text or precedent conferring a right). For a dramatic example of the
application of the negative-affirmative distinction, see Mazibuko v. City of
Johannesburg 2009 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/
cases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf. The South African Constitutional Court refused to invalidate
Johannesburg’s decision to use pre-paid water meters in parts of Soweto, a largely
impoverished area, and to use post-use billing in the wealthy parts of the city. The
Court found that only limited balancing is permitted for negative rights that constrain
the state, but affirmative human social and economic rights require a balance between
human dignity and the availability of public resources to fulfill them.
40 Professor Cass Sunstein made this point in his book, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 90 (1990). For an early
articulation of this view, see Ronald E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a
Habitable Environment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203
(1974); see also J. B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why
Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 245 (1999) (arguing that constitutional environmental rights are not desirable).
But see Victor B. Flatt, This Land is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W.
VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that the common law tradition of the protection of the
person can evolve to encompass an individual right to a clean and safe environment
that constrains societal efficiency trade-offs).
41 Flatt, supra note 40, at 4-6.
42 DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL
STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 76-77 (2012).
43 See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining
Public Health, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 184 (2005). This conclusion continues to be
challenged, see, e.g., Steve C. Gold, The More We Know, the Less Intelligent We Are?—
How Genomic Information Should, and Should Not, Change Toxic Tort Causation
Doctrine, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 396-97, 421-23 (2010).
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A constitutional right to environmental protection is not,
however, a necessary condition for a common law substitute. A
quasi-common–constitutional law Supreme Court jurisprudence
would serve as an adequate substitute, but the Supreme Court
has not developed one for two major reasons. First, the Court
does not view environmental law as a distinct area of the law to
be further developed.44 Most environmental cases ask the Court
to reverse an agency decision or interpretation of its statutory
or rulemaking authority. The Supreme Court has decided over
100 environmental cases since 1970, but these cases have not
yielded a coherent set of “environmental” principles. Instead,
the cases are treated as administrative law decisions or as
mere exercises in statutory construction. In fact, the Court’s
decisions involving issues of environmental law have been
more important for the development of administrative law than
for any particular environmental principles. For example, in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,45 the Court announced a two-tiered approach to judicial
review of agency constructions of its enabling legislation. This
test has become one of the bedrock principles of modern
administrative law, but the case misconstrued the Clean Air
Act.46 I leave it to others to decide whether the Court’s
approach to statutory construction, which ranges from invented
legislative history to arid dictionary searches to define a term,47
should be restated.48
Occasionally, a Justice will include a sentence that
recognizes the broader significance of the issue for environmental
protection.49 But, for each statement, there is a subjective counter44 E.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee ended the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals’ attempt to supplement the minimal procedural guarantees of the
Administrative Procedure Act in complex, science-based EPA rulemaking with a hybrid
approach that recognized an ad hoc right of cross examination. See Int’l Harvester Co.
v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-32 & n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
46 The substantive issue is whether stationary sources of air pollution in nonattainment, dirty areas could satisfy the new source review standards for plant
modifications by aggregating all sources of pollution in a bubble. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON,
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DANIEL R. MANDELKER & A. DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 478 (3rd ed. 1999), concludes that Justice Stevens’ reading of
the Clean Air Act has little support in the legislative history.
47 E.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732-33 (2006) (using Webster’s
New International Dictionary to decide the extent of federal power to regulate wetlands).
48 See Lawrence Solan, Is it Time for a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation?,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 733 (2014) (arguing that there should not be such a restatement).
49 E.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). The issue was whether a
programmatic environmental impact had to be prepared for planned coal leases in the
Northern Great Plains. Id. at 408-09. The majority found that the Department of Interior
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statement that often goes beyond the legislation at issue to roll
back environmental protection.50 The best environmental spin
that can be put on the Court’s “environmental jurisprudence” is
that the Court has not completely undermined lower court
precedents that have tried to base decisions on the purpose of the
legislative programs. For example, the most that the leading
scholar of the Supreme Court’s environmental record can say in
his revisionist look at the 17 cases dealing with the National
Environmental Policy Act is this:
[A] close examination of the Supreme Court’s NEPA precedent,
including the archival papers of many of the Justices who decided
those cases, tells a more interesting and less lopsided story. There
were many important environmental victories within those losses,
which have since played a role in NEPA continuing to serve as one of
the nation’s most important environmental statutes.51

The second factor contributing to the Court’s failure to
develop a quasi-common–constitutional environmental doctrine
is the Court’s well-documented indifference or hostility to the
project of environmental protection. A synthesis of the Court’s
environmental cases would be better entitled The Restatement
(First) of Environmental Degradation. The relevant constitutional
jurisprudence that has emerged is a mixed blessing for the
environmental protection project and it would be difficult to
restate. It is confusing, inconsistent, and contested. There is no
single foundational environmental protection case. Massachusetts
v. EPA,52 which held that the EPA had the authority and a duty to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions as pollutants, is the closest the
Supreme Court has come to recognizing the importance of the
environment to human kind. However, it is not a suitable
foundation for a general law of environmental protection. The
case is ultimately only a construction of a specific statute. The
majority’s recognition that global climate change is a real
problem could be precedent for the Court’s recognition of the
broader context of the environmental law cases that come to
did not have an existing or proposed plan for the region and thus there was no need for
large-scale EIS. Justice Marshall dissented and argued for a broader reading of NEPA
because “this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for
development of a ‘common law’ of NEPA.” Id. at 421 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50 In Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997), Justice Scalia characterized
the purpose, “if not indeed the primary [purpose],” of the Endangered Species Act as the
avoidance of “needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but
unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives.”
51 Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme
Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1585 (2012).
52 549 U.S. 497, 528-33 (2007).
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them. However, there is no evidence in post-Massachusetts
cases that the Court will do so.53
The Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence is the most
prominent example of the lack of consensus on a foundational
principle of environmental law. Modern environmental law is
largely the product of guerilla litigation that challenged a wide
variety of government actions. These lawsuits, which make up
the corpus of the judge-made environmental law, were made
possible when the Court partially decoupled one’s standing to
sue from the merits of the action.54 Citizen suits remain one of
the most distinctive, and globally admired, features of
environmental law. Shared private–public enforcement of
statutory compliance is environmental law’s most distinctive
contribution to public law. However, in the seminal case Sierra
Club v. Morton,55 Justice Stewart rejected the argument that the
Article III case or controversy standard requires only that the
court be presented with a legal issue ripe for resolution.
Instead, he held that Article III standing requires some nexus
between a specific plaintiff’s interest and the subject of the
lawsuit, leaving only resource users with the standing to sue.56
The Court has vacillated between treating this requirement as
a fiction and a fact to be specifically alleged and proved.57
D.

There Is No Substantive Law, Period

The existence of some core substantive law is a
necessary condition for any Restatement. Pure process-based
subject matter has not been the subject of restatements. For
example, there is a Restatement (Second) of Judgments, but no
Restatement of Civil Procedure. The imbalance between general
principles and the wide variety of technical rules makes it
difficult to restate process-based legal subjects. Environmental
law faces this problem. As Professor Aagaard has persuasively
53 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096
(2013); Sackett v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012); Los Angeles Cnty.
Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013); Decker v.
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
54 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
55 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
56 Id.
57 Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (noting
that plaintiff must submit affidavit showing where listed endangered species were
being threatened and that plaintiff would be directly affected by the contested action),
with Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83
(2000) (noting that allegations that plaintiffs who used river would be adversely
affected by future pollution violations sufficient to meet user equals standing test).
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argued, environmental law seems fated to be entirely a law of
dispute-resolution process.58 His basic argument is that there
are two primary and two secondary distinctive features of
environmental law.59 The primary features are the mediation of
public and private conflicts between shared natural resources
and the internalization of the external costs of human
consumption and resource use.60 The two secondary facets to
environmental law are the wicked conditions under which these
conflicts must be resolved. These include the spatial and temporal
disconnects between cause and effect and persistent scientific
uncertainty.61 The problem is compounded by what Professors
Ruhl and Salzman have described as regulatory accretion.62
Regulatory statutes have become more complex and tend to be
changed piecemeal rather than comprehensively reformed. The
result is a mass of increasingly obsolete and lengthy statutes,
unintegrated with each other, that do not lend themselves to a
coherent restatement of their objectives.
The inability of the United States Congress to address
climate change mitigation illustrates the drag of the two secondary
features.63 The net result of Professor Aagaard’s analysis is that it
is impossible to define a core of substantive principles because
“environmental protection sits in a position of constant tension
with countervailing interests and values.”64 This argument echoes
the conclusion of the late Lon Fuller in his critique of positivism.
His influential book, The Morality of Law, attempted to revive
natural law in the face of the desecration of German, positive civil
law by the Nazis. Professor Fuller concluded that a set of
procedural guidelines to establish the legitimacy of complex
decisions, which he styled “a procedural version of natural law,” is

58 Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal
Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 282 (2010). I have responded to this argument by
suggesting a few core principles, derived in part from international environmental law. Dan
Tarlock, Is a Substantive, Non-Positivist United States Environmental Law Possible?, 1
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 159, 162 (2012). Nothing in my argument that a small core of
mixed procedural and substantive rules might be possible detracts from the argument that
current United States environmental law is not suitable for restatement.
59 Aagaard, supra note 58, at 264.
60 Id. at 264-66.
61 Id. at 270-71.
62 See James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, Mozart and the Red Queen: The
Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003).
63 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and
Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 59, 67 (2010).
64 Aagaard, supra note 58, at 263.
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all that we can expect of a just legal system.65 He accurately
predicted the course of environmental law.
II.

PLEASE, NO RESTATEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Despite the many problems sketched above, the ALI
could undertake a Restatement of Environmental Law. The
Institute continues to move into recent fields as illustrated by
its forthcoming Restatement of Employment Law and its
ongoing Restatement of Consumer Law. A Restatement of
Environmental Law, however, would not be a good idea for two
reasons. First, although the ALI does nudge courts toward new
rules grounded in contemporary society, any Restatement is
inherently backward-looking. There must be something to
restate. Second, there must be something worth restating. For
example, despite the confusion in current American Indian law,
the Restatement (Third) of The Law of American Indians’
stated objective is “to cement a set of generally agreed upon
foundational principles that could shape further developments
in the field.”66 Or, as the Reporter has put it, the ALI intends
“to bring clarity to the field and to highlight its importance.”67
These stated objectives strike fear into the hearts of most tribes
and tribal lawyers. Clarity in the form of a Restatement could
freeze Indian law into the series of Supreme Court decisions
that jeopardize the federal government’s current Indian policy
of maximum tribal autonomy. When compared with Indian
law, the problem of finding something worthwhile to restate for
environmental law is even worse.
The basic problem for environment law is, as the
previous discussion indicates, that there is very little to cement
or restate. There is no common law or any constitutional or
quasi-constitutional environmental law jurisprudence. Further,
the many federal appellate and Supreme Court cases
construing the various statutes that make up positive
environmental law have failed to produce a set of coherent
environmental law principles that could be restated.
There are many reasons for this state of affairs. The
root of the problem is that our view of nature is radically

FULLER, supra note 15, at 96.
ALI Begins Work on Three New Restatements, supra note 37.
67 Shannon Duffy, Q&A with Professor Matthew Fletcher, A.L.I. REP. (Fall
2012), http://www.ali.org/_news/reporter/fall2012/05-professor-matthew-fletcher.html.
65
66
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changing.68 Originally, it was assumed that nature was perfect
and that as much of it as possible should be fenced off from
human intervention. This view has been eroded by the
emergence of more sophisticated theories of ecosystem
behavior, which recognize the dynamic nature of ecosystems.
Thus, the objective, according to these theories, is not to
preserve ecosystem stability but to maintain their resilience
over time. As a leading ecologist explains, “some of the most
telling properties of ecological systems emerge from
interactions between slow-moving and fast moving processes
and between processes that have a large spatial reach and
processes that are relatively localized. Those interactions are
not only non-linear; they generate alternating stable states.”69
As a result, the original concept of resilience as a near
equilibrium steady state has been replaced, and ecologists try
to measure resilience “by the magnitude of disturbance that
can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by
changing the variables and processes that control behavior.”70
For law, this means that all attempts to manage nature are
experiments; each experiment will have different targets and
protocols. This pushes the law from substantive to procedural.71
CONCLUSION
To grapple with the continuing challenge of
environmental law, we must look forward rather than
backward. Environmental history teaches that humans, since
at least the time of the Ancient Greeks, have viewed the earth
as a treasure chest to be exploited to sustain human welfare
irrespective of the social costs and limits.72 The conclusion that
we students of environmental protection have drawn is that, in
order to reverse this history of exploitation, we must develop a
68 See Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in
Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 172-74 (2012) (discussing the
different views of nature that have emerged and how these views influence
environmental law).
69 C.S. Holling et al., In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY:
UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 9 (Lance H.
Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
70 C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in
PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS,
supra note 69, at 25, 28.
71 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and
Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2011).
72 E.g., JENNIFER A. ANDERSON, MAHOGANY: THE COST OF LUXURY IN EARLY
AMERICA (2012).
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new relationship between humans and what we now realize are
our life-support systems in the air, soil, and water. To do this,
the treasure-chest view, which is once again in the ascendency,
must be replaced with a science-based stewardship norm.73 A
crucial step in the stewardship process is the further
development of environmental law. In short, environmental
law should not be restated. Instead, it must be rethought,
reimagined, and adapted to the preservation and enhancement
of the planetary life support systems.

73 See e.g., J. DONALD HUGHES, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD:
HUMANKIND’S CHANGING ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY OF LIFE 226-27 (2001); Gilbert F.
White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY &
ENVIRON. 1, 9 (1994); PASSMORE, supra note 21.

